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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
court's position'7 including Supreme Court decisions,"R yet the court denies
that there is any Supreme Court authority in point."' Of those cases cited
as being contra to this position, Pennsylvania R.R. v. St. Louis, Alton 6 T.
H. R.R.2 is anomalous in holding that the plaintiff was not a corporation
of the second state but only licensed therein, which fact indicates the neces-
sity of examining the corporate history. In such a situation Judge Goodrich,
himself, states that there would be no problem. 21 Again, he says that the
Supreme Court has not considered the problem since 1912,22 although, in
fact, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1936.231
The rationale of the court's opposition to the general rules seems to
lie in the statement that the plaintiff need only cross over into New York
in order to get federal diversity jurisdiction. rrhis appears unnecessary in
view of the fact that there is actually only one operating road regardless of
the number of charters it possesses.24 The writer believes this idea is funda-
mental to the court's decision and indicates its desire to have the majority
rule reversed. Judge Kaufman arrived at the same result in New York in
1950. 2" If this case is appealed it will surely be reversed under the great
weight of authority unless it and the New York case represent a new trend.
TAXATION-A TRUST RES AS A MEMBER OF A PARTNERSHIP
Plaintiff, member of a partnership, created a trust for the benefit of
his son and daughter from a portion of his share of the partnership. The
indenture of trust named plaintiff and two others as trustees and provided
that, as to the trustees and beneficiaries, a trust and not a partnership was
created. The indenture further provided that the trustees should not be
personally liable as partners in the firm. The plaintiff seeks a refund of
federal income taxes alleging that the trust res created is a valid member
of the partnership for federal income tax purposes. Held, a trust res cannot
be a member of a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Hanson v.
Birmingham, 92 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
A membership of a partnership at Common Law must meet the follow-
ing essential requirements: (1) the ability to contract,' (2) the assmnption
17. Id. at 105, n.4.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 107.
20. 118 U.S. 290 (1886).
21. 185 F.2d 104, 107.
22. Ibid.
23. Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line RR, 81 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936).
24. 185 F.2d 104, 105.
25. Lucas v. New York Central R.R., 88 F. Stipp. 536 (S.O..N.Y. 1950).
1. Kasch v. Comm'r, 63 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 644
(1933).
CASES NOTED
of the fiduciary relationship of principal and agent,2 and (3) the assumption
of unlimited liability.' Prior to the enabling act a married woman could
not be a valid partner;4 nor could a bank 5 or a corporation.6 An executor
or administrator may, under certain circumstances, 7 become a partner of a
firm in which his decedent was a member. However, if lie does so, he
becomes personally liable and, in effect, a new partnership is created., The
existence of a partnership for tax purposes is commonly tested by the appli-
cation of the following tests: (1) contribution of capital and/or rendition
of valuable services,9 (2) control of the business,'0 (3) good faith and intent
of the grantor," and (4) validity of a partnership under state law.' 2
A trust relationship contains three distinct elements: (I) a trustee,
(2) a beneficiary, and (3) a trust res. 13 The trustee possesses no power to
bind either the beneficiaries or the trust estate.14 His contracts are personal
ones, binding only upon himself.' "  As a general rule he cannot delegate
his duties or contractural powers."' Unbridled discretion in this respect
usually negatives the existence of a trust.' 7 In contrast to the strictly lim-
ited powers of the trustee, a partner possesses virtually unlimited ability to
bind either the partnership or the other partners. Despite the manifest
incompatibility of the two relationships a number of courts have arbitrarily
decided that the trustee,' and the beneficiaries," and in dicta have inti-
mated that even the trust res 20 could be valid members of a partnership
for income tax purposes. These decisions have given rise to a trust-partner-
ship relation unknown to Common Law.
The court, in the instant case, reasoned that since the conception of a
trust as a partner is completely foreign to the fundamental definition of a
2. Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 195 N.E. 250 (1927).
3. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695 (1913).
4. DeGraum v. Tones, 23 Fla. 83, 6 So. 925 (1887).
5. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295 (1906).
6. Kasishki v. Baker, 146 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 856
(1945).
7. City Nat. Bank v. Stone, 131 Mich. 588, 92 N.W. 99 (1902) (provided for by
decedent's will); McGrath v. Cowen, 57 Ohio St. 385, 49 N.E. 338 (1898) (contract
between surviving partner and administratrix).
8. Ibid.
9. Comm'r v. Towers, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
10. Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764
(1943).
11. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
12. Doll v. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725
(1945).
13. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 2 (1935).
14. Taylor v. Davis, 110 U.S. 330 (1883), cited with approval in Greenough v.
Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 494 (1947).
15. Ibid.
16. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 175, 176 (1939).
17. Ponzelino v. Ponzelino, 238 Iowa 201, 26 N. W.2d 330 (1947).
18. Sherer v. Comm'r, 3 T. C. 776 (1944); Oakley v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 1082
(1931).
19. Rose v. Comm'r, 65 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1933).
20. See Thompson v. Riggs, 175 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1949).
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partnership, it ought not be so considered for income tax purposes. Fur-
thermore, the indenture in the present case does not conform to the rules
of partnership in the state of Iowa. 21 Many courts bold validity under
state law controlling although the Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on
this particular point.22  Much of the present conflict is attributed to the
failure on the part of the various courts to properly analyze existing federal
statutes. The court here does not feel that either the legislntture or the
Supreme Court ever intended to create a partnership for income tax purposes
where none existed either under state law or under the Common Law.
At the present time there seems to be no hard and fast rule for deter-
mining whether a trust-partnership will be upheld for tax purposes or not.
The cases are conflicting and as yet the Supreme Court has failed to hand
clown a definite ruling on this particular point. The instant case presents
a well reasoned and exhaustive opinion which, if followed, will go far in
clearing up the present trust-partnership controversy.
TAXATION - EQUAL PROTECTION - DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Under a Michigan statute' a tax was assessed against plaintiff, an Ohio
corporation doing business in Michigan as a foreign corporation, on intangi-
ble assets that were acquired from the doing of business in Michigan and
removed from the state before the statute was passed. but had neither been
physically present nor invested in Michigan since. The statute contained
an exemption for intangible property owned by a domiciliary of Michigan
that was situated in a foreign state and taxed by that state. Plaintiff owned
and operated some mines in Michigan, but its executive offces and other
assets were situated in other states. Plaintiff paid the tax under protest and
sued for a refund. Held, for Plaintiff on grounds that such an application
of the statute is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Michigan, 45 N.\V.2d 46 (Mich.
1950).
A state is not bound to admit foreign corporations, 2 and it won't be
considered as a denial of "equal protection"'3 if the state does refuse to
admit them4 or puts onerous conditions on admission.5 But once a foreign
corporation has been domesticated, having fulfilled all conditions precedent
21. Hanson v. Birmingham, 92 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
22. Zander v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1949); Commn'r v. Telny, 120 F.2d
421 (1st Cir. 1941).
1. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 7.556(1 ),7.556(12).
2. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168 (U.S. 1868).
3. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1,
4. Paul v. Virginia, supra note 2.
5. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673 (1945); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Warner, 312 Mich. 117, 20 N.W.2d 127 (1945).
